

### Hashing and Public Key Cryptography

- Find examples when it is better to have the following combinations of services (if any):
  - Confidentiality without authentication
  - Authentication without confidentiality
  - Authentication without integrity
  - Integrity without authentication
- What is the difference between weak and strong collision resistance?
- What characteristics are needed in a secure hash function?
- In what ways can a hash value be secured so as to provide message authentication?
- What are the differences between MAC, HMAC and One way hash functions?
- Consider the following hash function. Messages are in the form of a sequence of decimal numbers,  $M = (a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n)$ . The hash value  $h$  is calculated as  $h = \sum_{i=1}^n a_i \bmod n$ , for some predefined value  $n$ .
  - Does this hash function satisfy any of the requirements for a hash function? Explain your answer.
  - Repeat for the hash function  $h_2 = \sum_{i=1}^n a_i^2 \bmod n$
  - Calculate the hash function of part (b) for  $M = (189, 632, 900, 722, 349)$  and  $n = 989$ .
- What should B do to confirm the source and integrity (if possible) of the message  $M$  in the following exchanges:
  - $A \rightarrow B: M + E(k_{AB}, H(M))$
  - $A \rightarrow B: M + E_{Pub}(k_A^{Private}, H(M))$
  - $A \rightarrow B: M + H(S + M)$
- For the three exchanges in problem 8, Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of these three arrangements for providing authentication using hash functions.
- In a public-key system using RSA, you intercept the ciphertext  $C = 10$  sent to a user whose public key is  $e = 5, n = 35$ . What is the plaintext  $M$ ?
- Suppose Bob uses the RSA cryptosystem with a very large modulus  $n$  for which the factorization cannot be found in a reasonable amount of time. Suppose Alice sends a message to Bob by representing each alphabetic character as an integer between 0 and 25 ( $A \rightarrow 0, \dots, Z \rightarrow 25$ ), and then encrypting each number separately using RSA with large  $e$  and large  $n$ . Is this method secure? If not, describe the most efficient attack against this encryption method.

11. Users A and B use the Diffie-Hellman key exchange technique with a common prime  $q = 71$  and a primitive root  $\alpha = 7$ .
  - a. If user A has private key  $X_A = 5$ , what is A's public key  $Y_A$ ?
  - b. If user B has private key  $X_B = 12$ , what is B's public key  $Y_B$ ?
  - c. What is the shared secret key?
12. Is 3 a primitive root of 11? Why?
13. In an RSA system, the public key of a given user is  $e = 31$ ,  $n = 3599$ . What is the private key of this user? Hint: You will need extended Euclidean algorithm to find the multiplicative inverse of 31 modulo  $\phi(n)$ .
14. True or False (and why?)
  - a. Integrity can be achieved without message authentication.
  - b. ECC can be used to provide confidentiality.
  - c. For a public key system to work properly, it should not be possible (practically) to learn either of the two keys from each other.
  - d. Man-In-The-Middle Attack can be used to defeat the security of Diffie-Hellman exchange.
15. In 1985, T. ElGamal announced a public-key scheme based on discrete logarithms. As with Diffie-Hellman, the global elements of the ElGamal scheme are a prime number  $q$  and  $\alpha$ , a primitive root of  $q$ . A user A selects a private key  $X_A$  and calculates a public key  $Y_A$  as in Diffie-Hellman. User A encrypts a plaintext  $M < q$  intended for user B:
  1. Choose a random integer  $k$  such that  $1 \leq k \leq q-1$ .
  2. Compute  $K = (Y_B)^k \bmod q$ .
  3. Encrypt  $M$  as the pair of integers  $(C_1, C_2)$  where  $C_1 = \alpha^k \bmod q$ ,  $C_2 = KM \bmod q$

User B recovers the plaintext as follows:

1. Compute  $K = (C_1)^{X_B} \bmod q$ .
2. Compute  $M = (C_2 K^{-1}) \bmod q$ .

Show that the system works; that is, show that the decryption process does recover the plaintext.